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Patrick Klepek, Not Every Developer Is Convinced Let’s Play Videos Are A Good Thing, KOTAKU
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a small group of people coming together after they graduate
college to develop a video game. The group’s members all want to make a
game that conveys what their passions are. They decide that the best way to
do this is by designing a story-based game. They spend two years writing
code, creating characters, and animating the game. After the two years, they
decide to publish the game on the gaming platform Steam so that PC gamers
can download and play the game and so the group can distribute the game for
sale. Shortly after the game releases on Steam, the group discovers that a few
large video game streamers have streamed the game on Twitch and YouTube,
and the videos of the stream are available to view for two weeks after they
stream. The group gets excited because these videos get a few million views
and hopes that these views turn into purchases on Steam. Much to the group’s
chagrin, those who watched the streams and videos of the stream instead
chose not to purchase the game because they already experienced the story.
The group with almost no money must now take on the streamer who
uploaded their game to Twitch and YouTube, but this streamer is much better
situated financially. The group decides to leave the venture of developing
video games because they do not believe they can profit from it and because
they cannot protect their work from being used without permission.
As illustrated above, video game developers take a substantial risk
when they begin working on a new project.2 Developing a game often takes
years of time, money, and resources, which can end in little or even no
payoff.3 No payoff is what happened to the developer of That Dragon,
Cancer, who had his story-based game posted to YouTube and saw no money
from sales afterward.4 Millions of people watched the YouTube video in
which a player uploaded a complete playthrough or “Let’s Play,” but this did
not translate into people buying the game.5 Ryan Green, the developer of
That Dragon, Cancer, encouraged “Let’s Play” creators to share their
experience with the game, but not in a way that just rebroadcasts the game.6
Video game streaming is the transmission of a player’s real-time
footage through a streaming service, such as Twitch.tv or YouTube Gaming.7
play-videos-are-a-good-thing/ (explaining the developer spent years on making the video game to see no
revenue from sales).
2
See id.
3
See id.
4
Id.
5
Id.; What Is a Let’s Play on YouTube?, MEDIAKIX (Feb. 3, 2016), http://mediakix.com/2016/02/
what-is-a-youtube-lets-play-video/#gs.03t9pb (defining “Let’s Play” as “a video screen recording of a user
playing a game while providing voice-over commentary”).
6
Allegra Frank, That Dragon, Cancer Dev Calls Out Let’s Plays for Why Game Hasn’t Turned a
Profit, POLYGON (Mar. 25, 2016, 5:45 PM), https://www.polygon.com/2016/3/25/11305862/that-dragoncancer-lets-play.
7
Nathan Edge, Evolution of the Gaming Experience: Live Video Streaming and the Emergence of a
New Web Community, 4 ELON J. OF UNDERGRADUATE RES. IN COMM. 1, (2013) http://www.inquiries
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The streaming of video games has been incredibly popular since the early
2010s. For instance, in 2013, Twitch drew in over 34 million unique users
per month.8 Streaming has also been gaining popularity at an astounding rate
since 2016.9 Hosting a streaming service is something so popular that both
YouTube and Microsoft have launched their streaming sites alongside
Twitch.10 Streamers clearly believe that their streams can be profitable.11 For
instance, one of the most popular streamers, “Ninja,” makes 500,000 dollars
per month, primarily through video game streaming services.12
Streaming, however, creates problems for start-up video game
developers who are trying to break into the market. The possibility that
someone may upload a video or stream a game and substantially take away
from the potential profit (thus, infringing on their rights) may create too high
of a risk for start-up game developers.13 The way to combat the uncertainty
developers may have about trying something new in video games is to protect
their rights.14
Creators are deterred from entering the market or disseminating their
works, which contradicts current copyright law and its origin in the
Constitution.15 Additionally, requiring a developer to encourage people to do
more than just rebroadcast a game raises a normative problem.16 Specifically,
under current community norms, rather than carefully contemplating whether
fair use applies before uploading a stream, there is a presumption that
uploading someone else’s copyrighted materials is always fair use.17 Thus,
the community norm and the copyright law may be at odds with one another,
leaving the potential creator in limbo about the scope of his rights.18
journal.com/articles/821/evolution-of-the-gaming-experience-live-video-streaming-and-the-emergenceof-a-new-web-community. See generally, TWITCH, https://www.twitch.tv/ (last visited May 25, 2021);
YOUTUBE: GAMING, https://www.youtube.com/gaming/ (last visited May 25, 2021).
8
Edge, supra note 7.
9
Joshua Fruhlinger, You Won’t Find the New Pop Stars in Movies. You’ll Find Them on Twitch,
DIGITAL TRENDS (June 9, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/gaming/the-popularity-oftwitch-youtube-gaming-other-streaming-sites-on-the-rise/ (graphing the growth of concurrent streamers on
twitch from 2016 to 2018).
10
Id.
11
Tae Kim, Tyler ‘Ninja’ Blevins Explains how He Makes More Than $500,000 a Month Playing
Video Game ‘Fortnite’, CNBC (Mar. 19, 2018, 4:18PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/19/tyler-ninjablevins-explains-how-he-makes-more-than-500000-a-month-playing-video-game-fortnite.html
(explaining that most of his income comes from Twitch and YouTube subscribers).
12
Id.
13
See Klepek, supra note 1.
14
See PETER THIEL & BLAKE MASTERS, ZERO TO ONE: NOTES ON STARTUPS, OR HOW TO BUILD THE
FUTURE 107 (2014) (“[A] startup messed up at its foundation cannot be fixed.”).
15
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; see Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
16
See Klepek, supra note 1.
17
See, e.g., Klepek, supra note 1; see also Willie Clark, The (Still) Uncertain State of Video Game
Streaming Online, ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 28, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2018/01/tostream-or-not-to-stream-how-online-streaming-game-videos-exist-in-an-ip-world/.
18
When this Comment discusses rights regarding video games, the specific type of right it is referring
to is in rem rights. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L. J. 357, 359 (2001). In rem rights are a right in a thing, held against all others
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Traditional property theorists support the theoretical framework of
having one’s intellectual creation protected in rem.19 Adam Smith
characterized copyrights in things such as books as “real rights” for as long
as the copyright is held.20 Further, Merrill and Smith, in their landmark
article, characterized property rights as creating duties against all others,
which allows for a basis of security to plan for the future.21 The ability to
prepare for the future is precisely where current copyright jurisprudence
regarding video game streaming is sparse compared with the number of
streamers potentially infringing.22 The uncertainty of the rights leads to the
problem that if a product has so few rights that it cannot sustain itself, then no
utilitarian innovation will occur.23
Copyrights in the United States must be clear for innovation to
occur.24 Although game developers are currently allowing streamers to use
their games for profit, this acquiesced use should not write away the rights of
all who hold video game copyrights.25 Developers presently in the market,
therefore, control the types of content created.26
Copyrights in video game streaming must favor creators so that
innovation can pave the way for new and improved video games. The
constitutional clause empowering Congress to create copyrights secures
exclusive rights to authors of original works.27 Combining the lack of
jurisprudence, the norms of the streaming community, and the vast expansion
of video game streaming leaves creators uncertain as to the true scope of their
“exclusive right.”28
This Comment discusses the gaps in the current copyright law as
applied to live streaming video games. Part II will discuss the background of
copyright law as applied to video games. Part III will analyze current
(as compared to rights between two individuals), in copyright law, that makes the author the sole holder of
those rights. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 106. The copyright regime does limit the scope of these rights through
defenses to infringement; however, these will be discussed in greater detail later. See infra Part II.B.
19
See ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 20 (1981); Merrill & Smith, supra note 18, at
359.
20
See SMITH, supra note 19, at 19–20.
21
Merrill & Smith, supra note 18, at 359.
22
See Kyle Coogan, Let’s Play: A Walkthrough of Quarter-Century-Old Copyright Precedent as
Applied to Modern Video Games, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 381, 405–409 (2018)
(highlighting that video games are a rising industry, and the closest thing to litigation was a DMCA
takedown issued by a video game developer).
23
See generally THIEL & MASTERS, supra note 14 (explaining that startups must be able to ask where
their business will fit into the world 10 and 20 years from now in order to explain how their business will
fit into that era).
24
See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8; Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
25
See Aaron Swerdlow, The Emerging Legal Battle Over Video Game Streaming Rights, VENTURE
BEAT (May 27, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://venturebeat.com/2017/05/27/the-emerging-legal-battle-overvideo-game-streaming-rights/; Merrill & Smith, supra note 18, at 388–90; Clark, supra note 17.
26
Clark, supra note 17.
27
See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8.
28
Id.; see Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 712, 759 (1980).
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problems surrounding copyright law from real property rights and normative
perspective. Part IV will propose solutions to the current gap in copyright
jurisprudence, considering the analytical framework offered in Part III. Part
V will conclude that although there are no perfect solutions to copyright law,
placing the rights to the creation primarily in the creator promotes economic
and utilitarian efficiencies. Better normative signaling to video game
streamers about the scope of their rights will give developers more confidence
in their rights, allowing for the creation of more video games.
II. BACKGROUND
Copyright law is the primary intellectual property that protects video
game rights. The Copyright Act of 1976 (“Copyright Act”) and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) codify modern copyright law.29 This
Comment focuses on the implications that live streaming video games have
upon the former, but the DMCA will be discussed relationally to issues
regarding the protection of creators’ rights. Modern copyright laws were
drafted nearly forty-five years ago, and technological developments have
rendered many aspects of copyright law ambiguous, which allows courts to
be flexible in applying the standards to a fast-developing society.30 However,
the ambiguity that has developed creates problems applying the law for those
using technology, unknown at the time the law was drafted, to display or use
their work.
Copyright, as defined in 17 U.S.C. § 102, requires (1) an original
work of authorship (2) fixed to a tangible medium of expression.31 Once an
author has created an original work fixed to a tangible medium, copyright law
grants them six unique exclusive rights in that work.32 The two rights relevant
to this Comment are: (1) the right to prepare derivative works and (2) the right
to perform the copyrighted work publicly.33 Public performance is essential
because it protects audiovisual works, including video games. Performing an
audiovisual work is defined as “show[ing] its images in any sequence or . . .
mak[ing] the sounds accompanying it audible.”34 A public performance
means “to perform . . . at a place open to the public or . . . to transmit . . . a
performance . . . to the public, by means of any device . . . .”35
29
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ 101); Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512).
30
See, e.g., 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F.
Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (fair use “‘is so flexible as virtually to defy definition’”); Digital Millenium
Copyright Act, 144 Cong. Rec. H. 7074, 7099 (Rep. Berman stating that the rapid increase in technology
required congress to address a lack of protections to copyright holders in what became DMCA).
31
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
32
Id. § 106.
33
Id. §§ 101, 106.
34
Id. § 101; see infra Part II.A. (explaining video games as audiovisual works).
35
17 U.S.C. § 101.
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A. Application of Copyright Law to Video Games
Copyright law protects video games as both literary works and
audiovisual works.36 The reason video games are protected as literary works
is because video games are embodied in written code that, when executed,
displays the game.37 Similarly, the reason why video games are protected as
audiovisuals is because they are projected and experienced primarily as
audiovisuals by computers displaying the executed code.38 Thus, when
evaluating a copyright claim, courts will have to dissect video games into their
literal (written code) and non-literal elements (characters, audio, artworks
displayed).39
For a video game to be copyrightable, the video game must
independently have some hint of creativity and must not be an idea or
system.40 In terms of computer programs, the Second Circuit developed a
three-step analysis for determining whether the computer program is
essentially a system of expression.41 First, the court looks at the level of
abstraction of a computer program.42 Next, the court “filters” the abstract
elements to determine what level of protection is warranted.43 Specifically,
the court looks at whether the abstract element is based on efficiency, items
taken from the public domain, or external factors, which are standard
techniques based on which operating system the program will run.44 Finally,
the court analyzes whether the infringing program is substantially similar to
the protected work.45 This process is important because it determines the
36
17 U.S.C. § 102(a); see also Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2nd Cir. 1992)
(explaining that computer programs were intended to be included as literary works); Red Baron-Franklin
Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 278 (4th Cir. 1989) (explaining that, in accordance with other
appeals courts, video games are categorized as copyrightable audiovisual works).
37
See Coogan, supra note 22, at 386.
38
See Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc., 883 F.2d at 278-79; see, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo
of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 835 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
39
See Clark H. Worthy, Determining The Scope of Copyright Protection For A Computer Program’s
Nonliteral Elements: Is It As Easy As 1*2*3*?*, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1079, 1087–88 (1991).
40
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b); see Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 355 (1991).
41
Computer Assocs. Int’l, 982 F.2d at 706–12.
42
Id. at 707 (explaining that low level of abstract elements in a program are more complex, whereas
high-level abstraction of elements breaks down a program into trivial functions).
43
Id.
44
Id. at 707–709.
45
Id. at 710. This comparison only includes things that are copyrightable, as determined through
filtration. Id. at 714. Some critics of early video game copyright jurisprudence have argued that modern
video games are closer to systems or procedures than actual copyrightable materials. See, e.g., Bruce E.
Boyden, Games and Other Uncopyrightable Systems, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 439, 441–42 (2011)
(arguing that video games are mere systems because they rely on input from a user). They do this in part
because user input makes the possibilities numerous. Id. at 457. Their reasoning is flawed because not
only have video games been characterized as audiovisual works, but video games do have a finite number
of sequential display outputs. Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 279 (explaining
that video games exact output image sequence will vary, “but there will always be a sequence of images”).
The finite number of sequences is true even in large scale “sandbox” games because the code and the
operating system, on which it runs, has a limited ability to construct sequential images. Clarissa Littler,
Computers, Programs, and Wrestling With Infinity, THE RECOMPILER, https://recompilermag.com
/issues/issue-1/computers-programs-and-wrestling-with-infinity/ (last visited May 25, 2021) (explaining
that computation is a finite process); see Coogan, supra note 22, at 409 (determining that courts will
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scope of protectability of works embedded in computer code, such as video
games.46
When determining whether a video game is fixed to a tangible
medium of expression, courts have been flexible. For example, in MDY
Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., the court held that the
copying of a video game’s code to a computer’s random access memory
(“RAM”), a form of temporary memory, was sufficient under copyright to
constitute fixation.47 Courts are also afforded even more flexibility when
determining this with respect to video games.48 Moreover, the dual (literary
and audiovisual) nature of video games allows for the fixation of the video
game to be in a literary form, which simultaneously protects the literary and
audiovisual features of said game.49 Copyright law’s text supports the court’s
flexibility and helps illustrate, at least historically, that courts have been
liberal in finding copyrightable elements of video games.50 Thus, courts have
traditionally regarded video game copyrights liberally when analyzing
whether a work deserves protection under current copyright law.
One notable case of copyright infringement came from Red BaronFranklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corporation (“Red Baron”).51 In Red Baron, the
court found infringement when a store allowed a coin-operated arcade game
(a predecessor to modern-day video games) to be played, visible to the rest of
the store.52 The court emphasized that playing the game in a place open to
the public constituted a “public performance” within the meaning of the
Copyright Act.53 Interestingly, Congress responded to this decision by
creating an exemption for coin-operated video games.54 Congress did so on
a provisional one-year basis and failed to pass an extension on the
exemption.55 Red Baron is, therefore, instructive on how public performance

maintain that audiovisual output of a video game system is a “particular expression of the system”).
However, when applying the Second Circuit’s more difficult test to “sandbox” games, they would, at a
minimum, be protected for their non-literal elements (such as picture and music played together), even if
the possibilities are expansive. See id. at 408–09 (explaining that a sandbox game with expressive
characters, an expressive surreal world, and a physics engine, when played would be a copyrightable
expression, despite a physics engine being a system under the Second Circuit’s test).
46
Computer Assocs. Int’l, 982 F.2d at 712.
47
MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Ent. Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 938 (9th Cir. 2010).
48
See Bryan W., Game Design Copyright & Patent Guide, https://www.gamedesigning.org/gaming/
copyright/ (last visited May 25, 2021).
49
See 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.08 (2020) (stating a writing must have “some material form,
capable of identification, and . . . a permanent endurance”); see also Goldstein v. California, 43 U.S. 546,
561–562 (1973) (“writings” for constitutional interpretation is any physical rendering of the intellectual
labor).
50
17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “fixed” as “sufficiently permanent…to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for…more than a transitory duration”).
51
See Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 275 (4th Cir. 1989).
52
Id. at 278–79.
53
Id.
54
17 U.S.C. § 109(e).
55
See generally id.
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of video games should be treated.56
B. Fair Use Defense
The fair use doctrine is a defense in copyright law to otherwise
infringing activity and includes four factors that the court weighs to determine
whether infringement claims can be avoided.57 First, the court will look to
the character and purpose of the use, including whether it is of a commercial
nature.58 Second, the court will review the nature of the copyrighted work.59
Third, the court will look at the substantiality of the portion used compared
with the whole work.60 Finally, the court will examine the effect of the use
on the market of the copyrighted work.61
In terms of video games, the courts have not commented directly on
the fair use defense as applied to situations similar to streaming. The most
recent and analogous case consisted of a PC emulator of games, similar to
those on the PlayStation, using Sony copyrighted screenshots in advertising
his emulator.62 In Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. v. Bleem, LLC,
the court conceded that although the infringement allowed the PC
programmer to profit, it did not substantially use the material, did not take
away the market for the copyrighted work, and was comparative in nature
rather than strictly commercial.63 Thus, the court held the fair defense
applicable.64
An issue with the fair use defense became apparent when the older
video game cases did not involve the same substance and character of
technology, leaving comparison difficult for modern video games. The
characterization of video games as an audiovisual work publicly performed is
more substantively infringing (than displaying screenshots of games) and is
closer to a similar character of the original video game (is showing images in
sequence).65 The analysis of the nature of the copyrighted work led
commentators to denote the variety of genres of video games as affecting a
fair use defense to the streaming of video games.66
For instance, many commentators have stated that multiplayer online
games are so inherently transformative that they would either be original

56

Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc., 883 F.2d at 278–79.
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Sony Computer Entertainment Am., Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 1022, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2000).
63
Id. at 1027–28.
64
Id. at 1030.
65
Coogan, supra note 22, at 397–98.
66
Id. at 397; see James Puddington, Fair Play: Economic Justifications for Applying Fair Use to the
Online Streaming of Video Games, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 413, 430 (2015).
57
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works or sufficiently transformative to justify a fair use defense.67 On the
other hand, commentators have acknowledged that as applied to games that
are more story-based, the fair use defense is hard to justify because even with
commentary, the market for the video game may be usurped by the streaming
of the game.68 This area of copyright law, as applied to video games, has
created much controversy in dealing with the issue of online streaming of such
games.69
Some commentators have emphasized that the filtration analysis is
helpful when analyzing fair use.70 Specifically, it allows the “thickness” of
the work to be weighed against how substantially the defendant used the
copyrightable elements.71 Although this process requires substantial factdriven inquiry, it would make the fair use doctrine clearer for users and rights
holders.
The uncertainty of any fair use defense further reduces the likelihood
that new developers will innovate or litigate, for that matter. This uncertainty
arises because the fair use defense is often subjective and amorphous when
applied by courts, thus, leaving a developer not only uncertain as to whether
his game is a mere system or sufficiently protected but also to how fair use
may affect his ability to market his game. A developer may be too uncertain
as to the ability to enforce his rights, such that the developer quits creating
video games entirely.72
C. End User License Agreements
Software and video game companies protect their copyrights through
the use of limited licensing agreements.73 These agreements usually take the
form of an end user license agreement (“EULA”), where the person who
wants to use the technology (video game) has to scroll or click through the
terms of the license and agree in some form before gaining access to the
technology (video game).74 The use of EULAs is standard practice, and
currently, many developers allow for some commercial use of their games via
third-party streaming.75 The permitted streaming of video games is primarily
67

See Coogan, supra note 22, at 399.
See id. at 391; Puddington, supra note 66, at 432.
69
Puddington, supra note 66, at 415–16.
70
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 203, 278
(2012).
71
Id. at 280.
72
See supra Part I.
73
See, e.g., Fortnite® End User License Agreement, EPIC GAMES, https://www.epicgames.com
/fortnite/en-US/eula (last visited May 25, 2021); Blizzard End User License Agreement, BLIZZARD,
https://www.blizzard.com/en-us/legal/fba4d00f-c7e4-4883-b8b9-1b4500a402ea/blizzard-end-userlicense-agreement (Oct. 9, 2020); see also Swerdlow, supra note 25.
74
See Fortnite® End User License Agreement, supra note 73; see Blizzard End User License
Agreement, supra note 73; see, e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes & Nobel Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175–76 (9th Cir.
2014) (walking through clickwrap and browsewrap end user license agreements).
75
See Fortnite® End User License Agreement, supra note 73; see, e.g., Swerdlow, supra note 25.
68
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due to the perception (and evidence) that publicly performing a video game
is closer to an advertisement than actual infringement.76 However, this is not
always the case.77 The uncertainty that currently looms in video game
copyrights will likely lead to stricter EULAs to reduce the risk exposure of
developers.
D. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The DMCA was created to address the growing internet use in 1998.78
DMCA limits liability for online service providers.79 It also allows for
injunctive relief in certain circumstances, commonly referred to as “safe
harbor” provisions.80 This limitation on liability, as applicable to internet
streaming, is controlled by 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1).81 That provision limits
liability if the material residing on the network is directed by the user of the
network.82 In other words, the streamer who uploads and casts a stream must
be in control of the content, which is currently the case on streaming
platforms.
This limitation on liability depends on whether the provider (i.e.,
Twitch) lacks knowledge that the material is infringing, is aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, or upon it obtaining
knowledge or awareness, expeditiously removes the material.83 Additionally,
the service provider must not receive a financial benefit attributable to the
infringing activity, where they have control of the activity.84 Finally, when
notified of the infringement, the service provider must remove the infringing
material.85 To obtain expeditious removal of the material, notice of the
infringement must be given to the service provider, and the copyrighted work
must be identifiable.86 This process is commonly referred to as a DMCA
takedown, which requires notice to the provider.87 Although this construction
allows for the removal of multiple infringing works on a single website, the
website is not required to search for infringements.88
The DMCA “safe harbor” and takedown laws cause information76

See Swerdlow, supra note 25.
See Klepek, supra note 1 (where game developer did not profit off of game when the game was
uploaded in its entirety. In effect this usurped the market for those who would have otherwise bought the
game).
78
See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
79
See generally 17 U.S.C. § 512.
80
Id. § 512 (a).
81
Id. § 512(c)(1).
82
Id.
83
Id. § 512(c)(1)(A).
84
Id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
85
Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
86
Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
87
Id. § 512(j)(3).
88
See Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) (2020); Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525
(2010).
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seeking costs that may be insurmountable to new developers. The cost of
discovering infringements of millions of users across multiple platforms may
be prohibitive of distributing a work that would be usurped by the public
performance of the video game via streams. The plausible deniability service
providers receive under the DMCA and the norm of infringement currently
allowed by market holding developers both stymie enforcement through the
DMCA before the market is displaced. Further, larger streamers are now
bringing in enough revenue that they can effectively litigate against even
larger developers.89 These realities greatly affect the certainty of the creators’
rights.
Currently, the informational cost is not necessarily going to be as
extreme in every instance of a new developer or even a new game. However,
there is at least anecdotal evidence that the usurping of a story-based game’s
market can occur before the infringing activity can be addressed.90 The
inability to police the infringing activity before its damage occurs escalates
when the amount of user-generated content is in the millions per day.91 The
difficulty in policing is compounded when the service provider needs to know
that a user is a repeat offender before they can terminate the user’s accounts
with the service providers.92 Enough users may infringe daily that repeat
offenders may not be discovered before their conduct eviscerates the market
for the protected work.93 Thus, DMCA is likely not adequate when dealing
with the incredibly transitory nature of streams, which in the aggregate, can
substantially distort the market of any sole copyright.94
III. CONTEMPORARY COPYRIGHT LAW ANALYZED
For progress to occur, first, one must be able to plan for the future.
Economic thinkers since the time of Adam Smith have argued intellectual
property rights as in rem (real) rights because they can be vindicated against
anyone in the world who prints a book or copies a machine during the term of
a copyright or patent.95 More recently, Thomas Merrill articulated that
because “property rights create duties that attach to ‘everyone else,’ they
provide a basis of security that permits people to develop resources and plan
for the future.”96 Thus, economic thinkers have consistently held the
viewpoint that copyrights and intellectual property rights generally are
economically beneficial, and this viewpoint matches the view of copyright

89

See Kim, supra note 11.
See Klepek, supra note 1.
91
See Fruhlinger, supra note 9.
92
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A).
93
See Klepek, supra note 1.
94
Kyle Tuckman, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: A Work in Progress in the Era of Live
Streaming, J. OF L. & THE ARTS, Feb. 25 2020, at 6.
95
See SMITH, supra note 19; see generally Merrill & Smith, supra note 18, at 359.
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Merrill & Smith, supra note 18, at 359.
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law as enacted by Congress.97
A. What Incentivizes the Dissemination and Creation of Knowledge?
Rights that are state-protected would naturally produce the most
efficient good for the greatest amount of people. This efficiency occurs in
two ways. First, those who feel secure in their rights (and right to sell those
rights) are more likely to share (for a profit) the property covered by
copyright.98 Moreover, one who can make money from the fruits of their
labor is more likely to create and disseminate those fruits when the law
ensures that the right to the labor belongs exclusively to the creator.99 Second,
by securing rights, allowances for risk are increased. There is a certain
amount of legal exposure that any right will have. By minimizing these
exposures in copyright holders, it allows them to safely and efficiently risk
more (and produce better copyrightable material) by attempting to sell to
more people or by attempting to innovate further.100
Because copyright law is ultimately grounded in the Congress’s
power to promote the progress of science and useful arts, the Supreme Court
has characterized the primary purpose of copyright as to secure the general
benefits derived by the public from the labor of authors.101 For instance, the
Court in the 1970s held that the dissemination of intellectual labor must be
compelled by a fair return for the author’s labor.102 The private benefit
derived is the mechanism that compels owners to share the copyrighted works
with the public.103 To do this, Congress has exercised its constitutional power
to legislate for the useful arts and sciences in the enactment of the Copyright
Act.104
However, some commentators believe the United States’s system for
innovation is not effective or efficient.105 Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Laureate,
has urged that intellectual property rights are unlike traditional (in rem)
property rights.106 Moreover, Stiglitz characterizes intellectual property as
“knowledge” because it can be shared with one person while remaining
available for another.107 Economically speaking, knowledge is a public good

97

SMITH, supra note 19, at 20; Merrill & Smith, supra note 18, at 369; see generally 17 U.S.C. § 106.
See Merrill & Smith, supra, note 18.
See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8; see Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 28, at 767–69.
100
See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8; see Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 28, at 767–69.
101
1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,
156 (1975)); New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 520 (2001).
102
1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03; see Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151
(1975)
103
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, n. 18 (2003); 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03.
104
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8; Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
105
See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L. J. 1693,
1699–1700 (2008).
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because its consumption is “non-rivalrous.”108 In essence, Stiglitz argues that
the dissemination of knowledge will always result in a net positive gain
because knowledge can be consumed by many without taking away from
anyone.109 This argument is, in fact, correct because the dissemination of
knowledge is a public good.
The Founding Fathers thought the same thing when they drafted the
Progress Clause, and the Supreme Court has interpreted that clause in the
same way.110 However, the purpose of the Progress Clause is twofold; the
primary purpose is to disseminate knowledge as Stiglitz thrusts forward, and
the second is to compel creation and discovery through the governmental
grant of rights.111 Thus, the argument Stiglitz makes about knowledge being
a public good is consistent with most thinkers and the Founding Fathers.
However, Stiglitz presumes that motivation to create and disseminate
works, at least in academia, is not to make money but to “influence ideas” and
“shape the intellectual debate.”112 Stiglitz’s presumption, or at least this
Comment’s interpretation of Stiglitz’s presumption, focuses on the notoriety
and esteem that comes with the popularization of an author’s creative work
as a primary motivator for dissemination.113 As stated above, all intellectual
property is a public good because it can be used by many without taking away
from the good. The point where Stiglitz and this Comment diverge is what
compels dissemination and, incidentally, creation of creative works.114
Stiglitz further argues that a grant of exclusive rights for intellectual property
stymies innovation and distorts what innovations occur.115
Stiglitz concedes that funding is necessary to further knowledge but
insists that government funding promotes better and more useful
dissemination of knowledge than does the grant of exclusive rights in the
United States.116 In his article, he offers alternatives to the current funding for
the United States’ patent regime: a prize system and government-sponsored
research.117 A prize system would be a government-funded incentive for
doing a specific thing (in the article, he uses an example of curing malaria)
and smaller incentives for subsequent improvements on the initial discovery
108
Id. A “non-rivalrous” good is something that can be used without depleting the good. See Amanda
Reid, Copyright Policy as Catalyst and Barrier to Innovation and Free Expression, 68 CATH. U. L. REV.
33, 37 (2019).
109
Stiglitz, supra note 105, at 1700.
110
See Harper & Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545–46 (1985) (citing Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
111
See Stiglitz, supra note 105.
112
Id. at 1695.
113
See Stiglitz, supra note 105, at 1695–1696. Although Stiglitz’s article is primarily on patents, he
uses what would be American copyright protections as an analogy. See id. This Comment similarly
critiques patent alternatives compared to copyrights. See supra Part III.A.
114
See Stiglitz, supra note 105, at 1695.
115
Id. at 1700.
116
Id. at 1699–1700.
117
Id. at 1697.
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(cheaper ways of creating the cure to malaria).118 This mechanism is
compelling but ineffective in the field of copyright. Moreover, only allowing
government-sponsored arts causes the freedom of expression to be restricted
and would not allow for innovation in areas the government does not feel are
worthwhile.119
Government-funded research would similarly be inapplicable.
Moreover, government-funded research, as it currently exists in the United
States, has encouraged the fabrication of knowledge rather than the discovery
of knowledge.120 Government funding follows many of the same flaws as a
prize system would, especially in the realm of copyrights. Governmentfunded research would not promote the discovery of knowledge but would
tailor the knowledge to whatever the government believed useful at the time.
The flaw with the government choosing one type of research for copyright is
that it would inherently exclude research for others.121
For instance, in the context of copyrights, criticisms of public
television funding were discussed in the 1960s.122 If taxes are funding the
television programming, then the public is paying for the programming on
public television.123 However, because the government, rather than people,
chose what is useful at the time, the government became a paternalistic entity
deciding what is good and bad to disseminate and discover with peoples’
money, with little input from the people themselves.124 A better regime
indeed would be to allow folks to vote with their money for what they
believed was useful and derive and create similar works off of the public’s
spending conscience rather than political conscience.125 Thus, a structure
where a government controls the means of discovery tilts toward politically
motivated discoveries, which are not necessarily what the public wants.126
In sum, Stiglitz’s view of creation and dissemination of creative
118

Id. at 1719.
For example, with respect to copyrights, the government may promote the development of novels
and movies, but not put prizes (or put lower incentive prizes) for things like music or video games. See,
e.g., Sara Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L. J. 433, 453-54 (2007); Thomas
Hemnes, The Adaptation of Copyright Law to Video Games, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 174–75 (1982). This
system would both distort and restrict the development of copyrights as a whole.
120
See, e.g., Ivan Oransky, Duke University to Settle Case Alleging Researchers Used Fraudulent Data
to Win Millions in Grants, SCIENCE, (Nov. 19, 2018, 12:10 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news
/2018/11/duke-university-settle-case-alleging-researchers-used-fraudulent-data-win-millions (discussing
Duke University settling a case for falsifying data to get federal grant money).
121
See AYN RAND, THE VOICE OF REASON ESSAYS IN OJECTIVIST THOUGHT, 239–46 (Leonard Peikoff
ed., 1990).
122
See id.
123
Id. at 240–41.
124
Id.
125
See id. at 242–43.
126
However, the argument Stiglitz puts forward is much more forceful in the context of patents, where
innovations can indeed save lives. See Stiglitz, supra note 105, at 1719. This Comment does not delve
into this argument; contextually speaking, Stiglitz’s point about patents remains forceful but ultimately
fails to be adequately extrapolated into the realm of copyrights. See supra Part III.A.; Stiglitz, supra note
105, at 1719.
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works is inapplicable to copyrights because there would be no way to finance
the creation of the works without granting strong intellectual property
rights.127 Specifically, without the ability to market and sell works, there is no
practical way to sustain the creation of creative works. Strong protections are
needed for intellectual property to be marketed and sold because creative
works are non-rivalrous.128 Similarly, Stiglitz’s claim that “strong intellectual
property rights” distort innovation is inapplicable to his alternatives because
similar distortion occurs when the government sponsors the creation of
work.129 As such, the better mechanism to incentivize creation and
dissemination is the current copyright regime.130 This regime, where the free
market decides what is useful and deserving of reward, is what the Founders
believed would best serve the dissemination of knowledge—one where the
creators hold their rights against all.131 Thus, to promote the creation and
dissemination of useful creations, the protection granted under copyright law
is necessary.
B. The True Nature of the Exclusive Rights of a Copyright Holder;
Defenses to Infringement
The Copyright Act not only granted exclusive rights to the authors of
the copyrights but simultaneously limited the exclusivity in things such as the
fair use defense.132 The Copyright Act codified the common law equitable
defense that developed under the previous statutes.133 The fair use defense,
as enacted, creates an asymmetrical right, which creates further uncertainty to
rights holders.134
Fair use requires a fact-driven inquiry before ultimately deciding
whether infringement occurred.135 Because the maximization of value in
copyrights requires clear rights, the fact-driven inquiry about the scope of a
copyright holder’s exclusive right increases the costs of preventing
infringement (or recovering for infringing activity).136 This fact-driven
inquiry, coupled with the minimal number of fair use cases applicable to video
game streaming, which could educate the true extent of legal exposure,
127

See Stiglitz, supra note 105.
Reid, supra note 108, at 37.
129
See supra Part III.A.
130
See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8; Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
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See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8; Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
132
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–07 (defining the exclusive rights of copyright holders and limiting those rights
for a fair use defense). The fair use defense creates asymmetrical rights, which in turn makes those rights
more challenging to enforce. See Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 28, at 767–69 (showing that a right
in something does not legally restrict the privilege in someone else, where affirmative defenses exist).
133
See Harper & Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (holding fair use is a mixed
question of law and fact).
134
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–107.
135
The finding of fair use is part fact and part law. However, because of the litany of factors weighed,
it is still a fact-driven inquiry.
136
David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139, 142 (2009).
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increases the legal exposure of developers—especially new developers.
Uncertainty could lead to two distinct problems, both of which
decrease the incentive for creators in copyrighted works. First, the
uncertainty of the legal exposure could cause new developers to restrict the
licenses given for their game.137 This consequence will be discussed later, but
in essence, the restriction of a license decreases the potential utility gains that
any fair uses would otherwise net.138 Second, uncertainty may detract from
those wanting to develop games.139 In essence, uncertainty takes away from
both the primary and secondary purposes of the Progress Clause discussed
above.140 Thus, the rights must be sufficiently defined so that both those
interacting with the copyrighted material and those disseminating it act for
the public good.
The asymmetry created via the Copyright Act accommodates the
First Amendment concerns surrounding copyrights.141 However, the unique
nature of video game streams makes this asymmetry even more uncertain as
to the actual extent of legal exposure to which developers are risking
themselves. This uncertainty is in part due to DMCA takedowns.142
Moreover, DMCA takedowns created an efficient way to avoid court for
copyright holders and service providers.143 The downside to these takedowns
is that less litigation occurs because most disputes are settled outside of
court.144 The lack of litigation is especially troublesome in a common law
system, such as the United States, where holders of rights can be educated to
their true scope when defenses (which create the asymmetrical right) are
judicially determined.
The issue regarding fair use is that most precedent is not analogous
to video game streaming, even early video game cases.145 Although analogies
may be drawn in other subject matters, such as video streaming services,
video games offer more of a spectrum of fair use considerations than
traditional video streaming infringement. Specifically, video streaming is
often the whole, a substantial part of, or almost none of the work.146 Whereas
video game streaming often involves commentary, user inputs, and other
considerations that make fair use a more fact-intensive inquiry. Conceptually,
137
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Copyright Bill, VERGE (Oct. 22, 2019, 7:02PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/10/22/20927545/copyr
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How Courts Work, ABA (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education
/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/cases_settling/.
145
See, e.g., Sony Computer Entertainment Am., Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000).
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in a case where there are many user inputs originating from multiple users in
real-time, the stream created would likely be transformative under the fair use
defense.147 Similarly, a story-based game streamed without commentary is
more likely to usurp a market, and, therefore, fair use would be unavailable.148
However, the four fair use factors, discussed above, create this dimensional
scale that can be hard for experienced attorneys to predict, let alone those
wishing to endeavor in developing video games. The inevitable conclusion
is that until further litigation occurs, uncertainty will loom in those wishing
to start developing a game, but fair use is comparable to this subject matter
with finesse.
C. Normative Issues with the Exclusionary Right of Public Performance
Current developer norms have created a normative problem for new
developers. Moreover, developers often permit (and encourage) public
performance by streamers because they see mutual economic benefit.149 This
norm is contrary to the exclusive rights imbued by the Copyright Act to
prevent public performance.
To demonstrate the normativity of property rights, this Comment
draws from Thomas Merrill, who explored normativity in the context of real
property rights.150 Merrill discusses exclusionary norms concerning the
customs of a group of farmers and ranchers in a county in California.151 The
norm he uses is as follows: cattle owners would not face any consequences
for the first time a cattle trespassed onto a farmer’s land, so long as they
assisted with any repairs and ensured it would not happen again.152 The norm
then allowed subsequent trespasses to follow with more severe remedial
measures up to and including self-help.153 Merrill later characterized the
general rule of exclusion (cattle, vehicles, people) as being exempt when the
trespass is of a neighbors’ cat, as acceptable within a given community.154
For a comparable analysis of video games with the analysis Merrill
used, a few concessions would need to happen. The community of
“streamers” would have to be a community in a sense embodied by Merrill.155
Looking at the community solely as streamers instead of those who play video
games may narrow the community to those with sufficient knowledge to
interact with streaming. However, because new streamers are entering into
147
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the community at an alarming rate, a change in signaling may be warranted
to correct the influx of inexperienced streamers.156 Nonetheless, a normative
analysis is warranted because the streaming community, as a whole, is likely
sufficiently knowledgeable to understand norms.
The current norm in video game streaming is that streaming of the
game is allowable without consideration of fair use.157 The degree of
consideration of whether streaming may constitute fair use may vary from
streamer to streamer, but the consensus is that because streaming acts as “free
advertising,” no permission needs to be sought before streaming a game.158
Thus, the norm is not to examine the scope of a game’s license or to seek a
license to stream for profit but to presume fair use is applicable.159
When a choice between two norms’ efficiency is debatable or mixed,
as it could be with the right to publicly perform videos, there is an
informational cost-advantage to selecting a norm that coincides with the
general in rem exclusion (public performance).160 The choice is whether to
adopt the current norm of presumed right to publicly perform a video game
through live streaming or to adopt the presumed in rem right as the norm, and
that the live streaming of video games is infringing upon the exclusive right
of the copyright owner.161 The latter norm has a lower informational cost
because the copyright owner already holds the exclusive right.162 The lower
cost is furthered by the limited licenses through which developers sell their
games in the shape of EULAs, which preclude in some way publicly
performing the game.163 Thus, adopting in rem rights to public performance
furthers the informational-cost advantage.
The current normative regime of video game streamers and
developers also shields many service providers from DMCA takedown
issues.164 Due to the transitory nature of streaming, DMCA takedowns would
be unfeasible.165 DMCA safe harbor laws would require knowledge or
circumstances that would put the service provider on notice of likely
156

See Edge, supra note 7.
See Klepek, supra note 1.
See Clark, supra note 17; see generally Klepek, supra note 1.
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See Shigenori Matsui, Does it Have to be Copyright Infringement?: Live Game Streaming and
Copyright, 24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 215, 239 (2016); Clark, supra note 17. Ray Narvaez Jr., known as
“BrownMan” on Twitch, believes that because his stream helps people buy the game it’s completely legal.
Id. However, he believes that if a developer does not want their game streamed, it is their right. Id. This
sort of mindset epitomizes the current problem with streaming: Streamers believe they are in the right until
told not to stream.
160
Merrill & Smith, supra note 18, at 391.
161
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–107; Clark, supra note 17.
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See Merrill & Smith, supra note 18, at 390–91. This norm would be comparable to one not allowing
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See Swerdlow, supra note 74; see, e.g., Fortnite® End User License Agreement, supra note 73; see
Blizzard End User License Agreement, supra note 73.
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infringement.166 Streamers may assume that they have permission or an
implied license to stream when they have no permission because many
developers do not enforce their rights.167 This assumption leads to the norm
in the streaming community of presuming they have a right to stream without
determining whether fair use or a license exists. This current norm hampers
takedown claims because knowledge of infringement will be nearly
impossible to prove when the current norms indicate the opposite on the part
of the streamer and incidentally on the service provider.168
The only feasible way to get content taken down would be to scan
through and look at the content of every user streaming.169 This review would
be followed by notifying the provider of infringement when it occurs.170 This
process would likely take a lot of money and time to effectively police, which
happens to be things that new developers are unlikely to have.171
Additionally, the number of streamers and streaming services is increasing at
a significant rate, thereby increasing potential costs to protect the right at a
rate similar to the increase in streamers.172 In sum, the multitude of streamed
video games combined with the number of users streaming, again combined
with the number of streaming services developed, makes it infeasible to
protect the copyright holders’ interest. The lack of feasibility is especially
true when the fair use defense is unclear as applied to different streamers, and
the factual inquiry required of a fair use defense is also unclear.173 Thus, as
the current normative culture exists, the developers’ rights are in limbo.
D. End User License Agreement Consequences, and Why Modifying Them
Decrease the Usefulness of Video Games
EULAs define the scope of use of the copyrighted works.174 EULAs
are also the most efficient way to define the scope of the rights given because
they must be interacted with before the license is used.175 However, one way
to minimize risk in the distribution of a copyrighted work, specifically video
games, is to restrict the public performance right through EULAs.176 The
166
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See Clark, supra note 17; see, e.g., Klepek, supra note 1; see generally 17 U.S.C. § 512.
168
See Clark, supra note 17; see also Klepek, supra note 1.
169
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whether the game is being streamed. Id.
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restriction is not socially desirable because the licenses would stymie future
innovations to the works and other transformative uses of the work.177
However, EULAs serve an important function. Specifically, they tell users
what the scope of their rights to use the works (games) is.178 A current and
continuing problem is the rate at which users actually read the licenses they
purchase.179 In a 2011 study with 2,500 participants, the estimate was that no
more than eight percent of users read license agreements in full.180 Thus, a
further restriction of the right to perform is unlikely to impact the norm
discussed above.181
IV. SO, THERE IS A GLITCH IN THE SYSTEM. HOW DO WE TROUBLESHOOT
IT?
There have been many proposed changes to copyright laws to
accommodate the dawn of rapidly changing technology. The changes range
from creating a copyright exception to live streaming video games, adding
compulsory licenses to the subject area of video game streaming, and
expanding fair use analysis to DMCA takedowns as some examples.182
Commentators on the other end of the spectrum often urge for rules rather
than factors for fair use analysis.183 These proposed solutions will be
explored. However, a more realistic two-part approach could lead to
improvements both streamers and developers find amenable.
A. Pro-Streamer Solutions
Pro-streamer commentators believe that the risks streamers bear in
the current regime are too great and that the current regime needs clarification
to minimize these risks.184 One solution proposed would be to adopt a
compulsory license regime.185 The advantages would be to come into closer
compliance with Japanese and Chinese approaches to streaming.186 In
addition, the compulsory license regime would balance the rights of service
providers, rights holders, and streamers.187 The proposal does not require
advanced permission for use and allows for cancellation by the rights
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holder.188 Although finding unity internationally in streaming is admirable,
the logistic problem of allowing an after-the-fact cancellation may end up
overly burdening the service provider and streamer, thus, leading to
inefficient dissemination rather than streamlined dissemination.189
Another pro-streamer solution is to allow streaming to occur without
consequences, so long as no one complains.190 This proposal reinforces the
normative problems discussed above, which leads to a decrease in creation.191
Yet another pro-streamer proposal would be for the service providers
themselves to conduct the fair use analysis on a case-by-case basis.192
However, this proposal misses the point of who is in the best position to do
the fair use analysis, the streamer. Additionally, the administration of the
proposal is near impossible because service providers are unable to predict or
analyze fair use during a live stream expeditiously.193 Currently, under the
DMCA, service providers must remove infringing content expeditiously
when a takedown has been adequately noted.194 Failure to take down the
infringing material expeditiously opens the provider to liability because the
safe harbor rules would no longer apply.195 Streamers who believe their
streams qualify for fair use can challenge the takedown and often get the
stream put back up.196 The proposal would require an entire rewriting of the
DMCA to fulfill its suggested purpose. In sum, allowing the norm to control
and putting the burden on the service provider misses the point; the burden
for being legal in streaming is on the streamer themselves.
B. Pro-Rights Holder Proposals
Pro-rights holders (those who would support the developer in the
video game scenario) ask for clearer rights so that the (justifiably) risk-averse
will create and disseminate their works.197 Moreover, fair use creates an
asymmetric right in the developer.198 Fair use is also subject to delineated
factors and, thus, furthering uncertainty.199 To facilitate clearer rules, two
commentators suggested legislation that would delineate presumptive fair use
(i.e., 10 seconds of sound recording or 100 words in a written work).200 The
188
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legislation would make the easy cases easier but would still not resolve more
complicated cases, such as live streaming games.201 There is also the recently
enacted Copyright Alternative in Small-Claims Enforcement Act (“CASE
Act”), which attempts to streamline the process for recovering against
individuals.202 The CASE Act is not expressly directed toward video games
but is targeted at small claims of internet infringement.203 Although the CASE
Act may address some issues raised in this Comment, it is unlikely to change
things dramatically because both parties to the infringement claim must
consent to the jurisdiction of the Copyright Claims Board, a three judge
tribunal.204
There are, of course, other proposals that seek to move copyright
from a standard-based regime to a bright-line rule regime in other ways.205
However, the bright-line rules clearly demarcating the “property lines” create
tension with First Amendment protections to free speech.206 A clearer rule
may not solve the problem faced by video game streaming because the live
streaming often contains comments of the product, entitling at least part of
the stream to fair use protection.207 Thus, a clearer rule is unlikely to satisfy
the needs of the gaming community or to rights holders and creators.
C. The Simple Solution that Allows Comprehensive Change to Occur
The solution to the problem comes from two angles. First,
companies/developers must do a better job of notifying consumers/streamers
of the limits on their right to stream. Since the norm of presumed permission
to stream has come about, EULAs have gotten longer and more detailed, and
no common-sense effort has been made by the developers to identify the
scope of licenses clearly. Second, the Register of Copyrights should advise
Congress on the current issue of video game streaming.208 The Register is
empowered to advise Congress on the scope of the problem. Thus, this puts
the problem at the public forefront.
The solution for copyright law comes from the lack of enforcement
201
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by stakeholders.209 Moreover, in order for a legal rule or norm to have an
effect in most cases, official enforcement of the legal rule or norm must be
forthcoming.210 Industry stakeholders are likely deterred by the fallout of the
music industry after the Napster resolution, such that enforcement by
stakeholders is not forthcoming in any event.211 With this in mind, better
signaling is the pragmatic solution to the deviation of social norms from legal
norms.212 Moreover, in America, social norms are impacted by what people
believe is the law.213 Americans believe that doing what the law says is the
right thing to do.214 Thus, consistent, regular, and affirmative signaling by
game companies when users interact with their products, and affirmative
signaling by a governmental body that copyrights and fair use are a concern
nationally will tell would-be infringers that streaming without considering fair
use and the scope of their license is not the right thing to do.215
On the developer end, frequent signaling of rights should happen
when the game is loading or booting up. Moreover, a short plain statement
on a loading screen will cheaply and effectively communicate the rights a
would-be streamer has in the video game license. This signaling statement
could be done with plain text saying, “before you stream your game, doublecheck the license agreement for what is allowed.” A statement like this will
not solve every issue of would-be infringement, but it would decrease the
likelihood of streamers, in the aggregate, usurping a games’ market.216 This
statement signals more effectively than a bare EULA because it focuses on a
particular section of the EULA and reinforces the importance of the rights by
reminding streamers of their duty before streaming.217
The Register of Copyrights has a vital role to play as well. The
Register of Copyrights heads the Copyright Office.218 The Register is
authorized, under the Copyright Act, to “[a]dvise Congress on national . . .
209
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issues relating to copyright . . . and related matters.”219 Acting under the
statutory authority to advise Congress, the Register should advise Congress
of the impending problems with online streaming of video games so that the
issue is at the public forefront.220 Specifically, by advising Congress of the
multibillion-dollar industry that has very little defined as to rights involving
streaming, the Register will let Americans and stakeholders in the video game
industry know that this issue needs to be addressed.221 Further, the Register
can minimize potential fallout by simply advising that stakeholders on the
streaming end, at a minimum, take into account fair use when streaming.222
A modernization of copyright law is likely in the future.223 However, simple
signaling can reduce uncertainties would-be developers may have and can
lead to the creation and dissemination of useful works in video games.
Having the Register only advise Congress of the gravity of the
situation while not requesting sweeping change allows for the status quo to
remain, in large part, where it has been while also reducing the uncertainty of
other stakeholders.224 In the recent past, former Register Maria Pallante was
an advocate for wide-sweeping reform in copyright to parallel the digital
age.225 Pallante requested the House Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Internet Committee on the Judiciary to be more forwardthinking and flexible when designing the next great copyright act.226
However, just three years later, Pallante was demoted by the Librarian of
Congress and subsequently resigned in 2016.227 Realistically, this signals that
a Register who advocates too much may be without a job once a new Librarian
of Congress takes office.228 Thus, a less direct approach, where the Register
only signals the gravity of the issue, is both realistic and practical for the
current problem.229
The corrective signaling by game developers and the Register of
Copyrights is not a permanent solution. The signaling is arguably mitigating,
while the stakeholders in streaming and game development most likely work
toward a non-legal solution. For that reason, the solution will be temporary.
However, the solution is also by far more administrable than rewriting
219
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legislation and is fairer to right holders than blanket licenses or fair use always
applying in streams.230 Thus, the solution this Comment proposes to fix
copyright issues with streaming is superior to those highlighted above
because, although the solution may be temporary, its application is
administrable quickly and allows for non-governmental intervention to
correct the issue.
V. CONCLUSION
Current copyright law does not afford developers of video games
enough certainty to create new games, especially story-based games. The
DMCA does not provide sufficient recourse to right holders when transitory
streams, in the aggregate, may usurp the market for the games.231 Video game
developers, like the ones illustrated in the introduction, may have to wait for
Congress to act or for a landmark judicial decision before they feel confident
enough in the protection of their creations to develop again. Additionally, the
likelihood of meaningful, comprehensive copyright legislation addressing
video games is poor, and with the fallout that happened after the Napster case
in music, developers are unlikely to litigate, thus leaving little room for
meaningful change.232 However, the two-part solution this Comment
proposed will reduce uncertainty in developers by signaling to streamers, at a
minimum, fair use needs to be considered before streaming. The solution is
quick, administrable, and should encourage would-be developers to create.
The solution will address immediate problems, but for a long-term
solution, either Congressional legislation needs to intervene, or industry
stakeholders would need to come to a non-legal solution. In either case, this
Comment’s proposed solution bridges the gap with a low-cost, easily
administrable solution so that a meaningful resolution can happen.
Alternatively, if no resolution occurs, this Comment’s solution will mitigate
potential harm that could occur because of the uncertainty that exists in the
video game industry.
In sum, there are many solutions to video game streaming and
copyrights.233 This Comment proposes a quick and administrable solution to
the problems with video game streaming and copyrights that can be
supplemented by existing proposed legal solutions or by non-legal industry
changes. For new developers to enter the market, uncertainty with respect to
their rights must be minimized efficiently. Thus, this Comment’s proposed
solution addresses the immediate problem while leaving downstream
solutions to Congress or legislatures.
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